A message to a meeting of the Friends of the High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response, May 28 2026
Good morning,
As of this morning, 1,077 people are suspected cases of Ebola Bundibugyo. 238 suspected deaths. Three provinces in DRC are affected. There are seven confirmed cases in Uganda’s capital.
I’ve responded to Ebola before. I know what the early signals of a disaster look like.
The first known case — ‘patient zero’, as the DRC Health Minister himself named her — was a nurse. April 24. Bunia. She died. That’s how the chain was discovered.
Nobody knew it was Ebola. The diagnostic tests in the field only detected Zaïre. Not Bundibugyo. Samples traveled over 1,000 miles to Kinshasa. Some arrived at the wrong temperature. Twenty days passed between the first death and confirmation.
Twenty days.
I’ve seen these signs of an uncontrolled outbreak before. 2014. West Africa. Bad memories. As in DRC: disconnected chains of transmission, a mobile population at a three-country confluence, healthcare workers dying, no specific vaccines or treatments approved. The basics of outbreak response — identification, isolation, contact tracing, safe burials — struggling to be implemented. Resources lacking. Insufficient international aid. The ingredients are the same.
But DRC has one extra ingredient that makes it worse: armed groups controlling territory and disputing resources from the mines. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Challenged humanitarian access. A weakened health system.
DRC is the West Africa Ebola horror story — in an accelerated form.
Healthcare worker deaths are an ominous sign of an unravelling health system — they are the last line of defense. A treatment center was burned down five days after the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) declaration, leading to dozens of Ebola patients fleeing into the community. Contact tracers are reaching 21% of identified contacts.
Twenty-one percent. The response is lethally running behind.
Dr. Tedros declared a PHEIC within 48 hours. The first time in WHO history without convening an Emergency Committee first. He saw the same signs — disconnected chains, mobile mining populations, three-country confluence, dead healthcare workers, no vaccine — and he didn’t wait. That’s progress. Real progress.
But 48 hours doesn’t give you a vaccine that doesn’t exist yet. It doesn’t restore CDC staff cut by 25%. It doesn’t open roads blocked by armed groups. It doesn’t rebuild community trust after a treatment center is set on fire. The alarm rang faster. The house is still burning.
Three weeks ago, we thought hantavirus on the MV Hondius was a stress test for the International Heatlh Regulations — a One Health textbook case. It was a warm-up. Bundibugyo is our collective acid test for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.
We lamented that everything was missing — diagnostics, financing, countermeasures, Annex 12. Same gaps. Different pathogen. Higher stakes.
So what do we need?
As someone who has been in those Ebola treatment centers — who has watched people die from infections we could do more to prevent — here is what we need.
We need the Pathogen Access and Benefits Sharing Annex 12 finalized for the Pandemic Agreement. With a date. Not “continued negotiations.” A date. The Bundibugyo strain had 206 cases across two outbreaks before 2026. No company developed a vaccine — because 206 cases is not a market. Fourteen years lost. That is what no Annex 12 looks like. That is what it costs.
We need the $15 billion financing gap closed. The Pandemic Fund exists. Fund it — and disburse now in DRC. Every country in this room needs to invest domestically in preparedness and not cut it when the headlines move on. It is as if the mayor of my city threatened to defund the firehouse after each wildfire season.
We need the 100 Days Mission to deliver on its promise. A vaccine against Bundibugyo is in development — but six to nine months away from any dose ready for human testing. Six to nine months. Tell that to the patients in Ituri today.
We need sustained political leadership on epidemic and pandemic threats — not just when it makes the headlines. Leaders need to step up for the most robust Ebola response possible in DRC, accelerate clinical trials instead of closing borders under domestic political pressure for an Ebola-free FIFA game.
The pandemic agreement was adopted in May 2025. The IHR amendments entered into force in September 2025. We all fought for both. That matters.
But a treaty without Annex 12 is a promise without delivery. Let’s finish the job — a pandemic treaty with a PABS that is fair for all.
1,077 cases this morning. The 17th Ebola outbreak in DRC. The largest Bundibugyo outbreak in history. We are still being outpaced — at enormous human cost.
The 18th outbreak will come. Somewhere, a nurse will care for another patient zero and doesn’t know it yet. The question is what we will have built by the time it happens. This is up to us.
Thank you.
About The Independent Panel
The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response was established to provide an independent review and recommendations on global pandemic preparedness and response in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Co-chaired by former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark, the Panel continues to monitor progress and advocate for strengthened global health security.
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