


Improving Monitoring of Pandemic Risk, Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery

Findings from a survey on current and future monitoring

February 2026

The current monitoring ecosystem: fragmentation and gaps



Source:
Independent
Panel monitoring
brief, May 2025

Pandemic monitoring: the current context

Reviews have shown several gaps in monitoring systems:

- There is some strong work inc. on global monitoring (e.g. GPMB, IHR, 100 Days Mission)
- But overall, current ecosystem is fragmented, underfunded, largely self-reported or voluntary, and not sufficiently independent
- Some country preparedness monitoring is more robust, but gaps remain
- Organisational readiness monitoring is limited
- Lack of transparency and accountability
- Few incentives to comply, with little financing or follow-up to improve systems

The next two years are significant:

- Landscape changes upcoming, including sunseting of GPMB and IPPS
- Considerations of Pandemic Agreement monitoring
- An opportunity for MS to commit at the UN High Level Meeting on PPPR in September 2026

Recent work to advance monitoring on the spectrum from risk to readiness

- **October 2024:** Pandemic risk synthesis meeting involving UNF, NAM, Fiocruz, PAX *sapiens* and others
- **May 2025:** The Independent Panel publishes a policy brief on pandemic monitoring
- **Summer 2025:** The Independent Panel, IPPS, GPMB and NAM convened several meetings from July to consult widely and to start a process that results in consensus on approach to Member States to advance comprehensive pandemic monitoring at the 2026 HLM
- **Early September 2025:** The group share a survey to stakeholders to gather views on current monitoring system, and proposals for future incl. on pandemic risk
- **Late September 2025:** The group convened a meeting of stakeholders at the time of the UNGA; presented interim survey results; survey remained open through mid-October 2025

The survey: overview, objectives


- Captures views on today's monitoring ecosystem including strengths and gaps, and on the possible scope and design for the future of monitoring risk and readiness
 - Contains a section on pandemic risk synthesis
- Questions: mostly qualitative
- Distribution: through Independent Panel and IPPS channels to several 1000s
- Opened on September 9, remained open through mid-October
- Sought to achieve wide geographic representation



Overview of survey respondents


- 107 total respondents – though most skipped questions
- 35-45 meaningful responses
- Includes several expert views
- Responses from all regions, but most respondents in North America and Europe

Geographic diversity (working location) of respondents




Respondents and geographical diversity

Select countries where survey respondents are working




Respondents and sectoral diversity

What sector do you work in?



Varied sectors represented

Do you work at global, regional or national level?



Respondents at all three levels, some overlapping

Overview of survey response trends and themes

Monitoring now: strengths & gaps

(representing approximately 45 meaningful responses)

Most useful monitoring mechanisms

- **Multiple tools seen as useful and credible:**

- Joint External Evaluation (JEE)/IHR monitoring – 11 mentions
- Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB) – 5 mentions
- Global Health Security Index – 5 mentions
- 100 Days Mission Scorecard – 6 mentions

**Other mentions include: GISRS, GOARN, Africa CDC, country-specific disease surveillance mechanisms, PHEICs, and WHO/UNICEF WASH tracker (among others)*

- **Characteristics highly valued for monitoring mechanisms:**

- Structures that allow for comparison (over years, across countries or regions) with some standardisation
- Independence
- Transparency
- Sub-national and community-level metrics
- Actionable reporting/indicators

Monitoring gaps identified

Preparedness gaps (system capacity and readiness)

- Operational readiness and surge capacity
- Sustainable financing to prepare for and respond to threats
- Manufacturing and supply chain capacity and readiness
- Subnational and community-level preparedness
- Governance, leadership and accountability

Risk gaps (surveillance and detection)

- Insufficient oversight of One Health links/dynamics
- Zoonotic spillover risk
- Antimicrobial resistance
- Early warning systems and real-time threat surveillance

*“...we don’t see any existing mechanism that comes close to being ideal. At the global level, the independent monitoring mechanism was dropped from the current pandemic agreement draft, leaving the **Joint External Evaluation (JEE)** as one of the main tools we currently have, though it remains voluntary and often involves subjective assessment”*

- Respondent working in Southeast Asia

*“...**Readiness indices** such as the GHSI and the IDRI **have NOT proved to be reliable indicators of the impact of a pandemic** (the underlying problem being that they fail to account for very different national/regional vulnerabilities to specific pathogens)”*

- Respondent based in the UK

How respondents characterized independence

- **Political independence** – freedom from political interference/ influence/ pressure
- **Conflict of interest management** – minimizing risk of bias and vested interests from stakeholders affected by outcomes
- **Evidence-based** – science-led, objective and with data-driven approaches
- **Financial autonomy** – funding sources protected from stakeholder pressures, diverse in nature and secure
 - Not contingent on entities that could influence neutrality
- **Transparency & accountability** – publicly available data and reporting with open, community-engaged processes
- **Multi-stakeholder governance**– inclusive representation from a diverse group
 - Civil society, scientists, policymakers, etc.

A balancing act of maintaining credibility through separation while ensuring relevance through engagement and enabling accountability without being punitive.

“Independence should encompass financial autonomy, geographic and political diversity within governance structures, and operational separation from governmental and private sector influence.

Importantly, independence should not mean isolation from society: the mechanism must ensure inclusive participation, provide lay summaries of its work, and maintain open channels for feedback to serve public and civil society needs alongside scientific interests.”


- Respondent working in Asia at the global, regional and national level

Potential pandemic risk assessment and risk-type body

(approximately 37 meaningful responses in this section)

Support for a pandemic risk assessment body

Support for pandemic risk assessment body
(35 responses)



Respondents would value a mechanism that:

- Considers country capacity and plans
- Is dynamic and evolves
- Relevant for local communities and decision-makers
- Avoids duplication of existing mechanisms/efforts

“... [a pandemic risk assessment] body should **complement, rather than duplicate, existing initiatives by filling analytic gaps and ensuring its findings are translated into concrete, actionable guidance**”

- Respondent working in Japan

“While the concept of a globally representative, consensus-driven pandemic risk assessment body is valuable, it **may not be sufficient to address the core gaps that constrain decision-making today**”

- Respondent working at the global level

Benefits and challenges for a pandemic risk-type body

Potential benefits:

- Independence may help depoliticize, build credibility, and build trust
- Could support advocacy and guide research and implementation agendas
- Better support countries to predict/plan/prepare
- Support data-driven, evidence-based investment

Potential challenges:

- Requires an interdisciplinary team and political support
- Some views that it would need to be fully independent to be useful
- May not be sufficient to address constraints on decision-making today
- Would need to avoid duplication with other efforts
- High effort/investment with potentially low uptake

Considerations for a pandemic risk-type body

Timeliness of reporting: 80% wanted faster but less comprehensive reports

Approach of reporting: 67% wanted several smaller but more focused reports

Funding models: 33% wanted funding limited to multilateral/government sources only, while 67% favoured support from multilateral and government sources **and** additional support from philanthropic and private sources

Governance formats: 46% favoured government endorsement of policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive reports while 54% favoured full scientific independence allowing for policy prescriptive reports but without government endorsement


Independence and structure: 42% favoured a multilateral secretariat (e.g. WHO, FAO) while 58% favoured a fully independent secretariat and organisation.

Strengthening consolidated monitoring mechanisms and approaches

(approximately 35 meaningful responses)

Broad support for coherence and consolidation

Support for a readiness monitoring mechanism to consolidate existing monitoring efforts and address gaps



- Agreement among several respondents on the value of greater coherence in the monitoring landscape
- Respondents favour:
 - Building on and/or learning from existing mechanisms
 - Reducing duplication
 - Filling critical gaps
 - Collaboration to minimize fragmentation

“Consolidation is not the correct term, it should be to **coordinate existing monitoring efforts**. Build a common framework that different systems can leverage and utilize”

- Respondent working in the US

“[the] objective of a comprehensive mechanism should be to **inform policy, investment decisions, and concrete actions that increase global, regional, and country readiness**”

- Respondent working in Asia

Consolidated monitoring mechanism governance approaches

Varied support for several different models:

- IPCC Approach, e.g. WMO/UNEP model
- Hybrid hosting approach, e.g. WHO/World Bank model of GPMB
- Independent Secretariat

Preferred contributors:

- Governments at all levels
- Multilateral institutions, e.g. WHO, World Bank, Gavi
- Research and scientific partners, e.g. academic institutions, scientific networks
- Civil society stakeholders
- Private sector partners and innovators

Key themes, considerations,
and next steps

Cross-cutting: country relevance and equity

Several stressed that monitoring is effective only if it:

- Supports national prioritisation and planning
- Informs investment and financing decisions
- Reflects equity and differentiated capacities
- Strengthens LMIC systems and reaches vulnerable populations
- Supports decision-making and policy setting at the global, regional, and national levels

*“Effective preparedness requires linking findings to political and financial incentives. **A risk body without mechanisms to influence policy or resource allocation may have limited practical impact”***

- Survey respondent

Risk and readiness: summary of core principles

- **Independent governance** free from single organization or donor control
- **Transparent methodologies** with publicly accessible data and reporting
- **Equity-focused design** prioritizing LMIC representation and needs
- **Action-oriented outputs** that translate monitoring into concrete policy/investment decisions
- **System integration** building on existing frameworks (JEE, SPAR, IHR, One Health) rather than duplicating
- **Multi-stakeholder participation** incl. gov, academia, CSOs, private sector, & communities
- **Accountability** linking assessments to financing decisions & implementation tracking
- **Non-punitive approach** encouraging data sharing/continuous improvement through learning
- **Sustainable funding model** not dependent on single sources or time-limited commitments

Key messages

- ① The existing PPR monitoring ecosystem is useful but remains fragmented and ill-equipped to capture the full spectrum of evolving pandemic risk and readiness
- ② Wide support for greater coherence, synthesis and integration across existing mechanisms, and filling critical gaps
- ③ Expectations for any future consolidated monitoring or pandemic risk-type body to be independent, scientifically robust, provide regular reports that support decision-making and priority setting

Potential next steps for the survey co-leading organisations

- 1 Consider expanding survey or completing a follow-up survey to fill gaps in responses for regions including Asia, Latin America and parts of Africa not robustly represented in the initial survey
- 2 Follow up with respondents who provided robust responses/clear recommendations for future monitoring mechanisms in the next interview analysis stage to provide further detailed recommendations
- 3 Given some mixing of 'risk' and 'readiness', finalise a short definitions document
- 4 Complete mapping exercise reviewing all organisations engaged in pandemic risk, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery monitoring to identify duplications, overlaps, and gaps and inform future proposals